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I. INTRODUCTION
HE new century is rushing toward us and the rate of change occur-
ring all around us so staggers the imagination that it is literally
indescribable. The result is what may be called "metaphorical ex-
haustion." A telecommunications revolution has led to hopes for the
construction of the information highway, which quickly became the infor-
mation superhighway, followed with little hesitation by countless spin-off
metaphors-road kill on the superhighway, the fast lane, the slow lane,
the passing lane, the off ramp, and toll booths. More quickly than these
metaphors gain currency, they lose whatever descriptive power they may
have. Polls indicate that, not surprisingly, most Americans have only a
vague idea of what the information superhighway actually is.
Sometimes the metaphors get hopelessly confused and end up sound-
ing positively frightening. One prominent newspaper recently noted in
an editorial that "[a] single wire [may become] a highway over which a
flood of... services will flow into customers' homes."1 We may have to
learn to dog-paddle in our living rooms. Before concluding the para-
graph, the paper predicted that "[a] market now ruled by sometimes lazy
monopolists would be turned into a competitive dogfight."'2 Of course, a
dogfight in the middle of a highway is dangerous for drivers and for dogs,
even without the added problems of lazy rulers and floods.
Amidst all of these dogfights and floods, the fundamental organizing
principle of the American economy remains sound: Free and open mar-
t This essay is a modified version of Antitrust Enforcement and American
Prosperity, Address Before the Antitrust Section of the New York Bar Association (Jan.
26, 1995).
* B.A., LL.B., Stanford University. Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.




kets characterized by competition will stimulate innovation, promote
prosperity, and contribute to the international success of the nation's
economy and businesses. The central purpose of the antitrust laws, of
course, is to promote that principle by protecting the competitive process.
In this sense, vigorous, intelligent antitrust enforcement is as vital to
America's economic health in the twenty-first century as it has been for
the twentieth century.
II. THE HISTORICAL RECORD
The United States committed itself over a century ago to protecting fair
competition in open markets. The Sherman Act, passed by Congress in
1890 with only one dissenting vote and signed by a Republican President,
and the other federal antitrust laws have helped to create the environ-
ment of economic opportunity that has been essential to America's pros-
perity in this century. The connection between the nation's antitrust
policies and its economic strength is illustrated most vividly by the fact
that more and more countries are recognizing the benefits of competition
on the merits protected by vigorous antitrust enforcement.
The historical record of antitrust enforcement demonstrates its contri-
bution to American economic vitality and the benefits of sound antitrust
enforcement for the American business community. One example is the
dismantling of the Bell System's monopoly over long distance communi-
cations equipment. 3 The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of
Justice (the "Division") vigorously pursued the monopolization case
against the Bell System through both Republican and Democratic admin-
istrations-from the opening of the investigation in the Nixon adminis-
tration through litigation during the Ford and Carter administrations to
its successful conclusion in the Reagan administration.
Professor William Baxter, who headed the Division at the beginning of
the Reagan administration, negotiated the 1982 settlement that resulted
in the entry of the Modification of Final Judgment, or MFJ. 4 The MFJ
ended the Bell System's monopoly over the long-distance telephone and
communications equipment markets and provided for the creation of the
Regional Bell Operating Companies (the "Bell Companies"). Although
the Bell Companies retained monopolies over most local telephone ser-
vice in their respective regions, the MFJ barred them from entering the
long-distance and manufacturing markets, thus substantially reducing
their incentive to use local monopoly power to impede competition in
those markets.
The burst of competition and innovation touched off by the MFJ has
benefited our economy-it has benefited American businesses and con-
sumers-for over a decade now. As just a recent example of the divi-
3. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom., Mary-
land v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
4. See Remarks of Professor William Baxter, Former Assistant Attorney General, Anti-
trust Division, 39 ANTITRUST BULL. 895, 895-97 (1994).
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dends of competition, a New York Times headline recently proclaimed:
"Telephone Price War Heats Up."'5 The accompanying story predicted
that recent moves by Sprint could set off a "bigger price war in the long-
distance telephone industry."'6 The story explained that Sprint's move
was a "counterattack" to "an aggressive ... package of discounts" that
had previously been offered by AT&T.7 The Times followed up that
story with a front page article, headlined "No-Holds-Barred Battle for
Long-Distance Calls."8
Price wars and no-holds-barred battles in the long-distance telephone
market were unimaginable before the Division successfully dismantled
the Bell System's vertically integrated monopoly. Now they are as com-
mon as television commercials. The result for businesses and consumers
has been lower prices, better service, and more choices. Since the MFJ,
long-distance prices for residential customers, as measured by the reve-
nue per minute of the three largest long-distance providers, have dropped
sixty-six percent in real terms,9 minutes of use have increased dramati-
cally,10 and there are now hundreds of long distance companies from
which to choose." And choose Americans did in 1994: More than
twenty-five million people changed long distance carriers at least once
last year.' 2
The basic point is: The direct beneficiaries of antitrust enforcement in
the AT&T break-up were businesses, beginning with MCI, Sprint, and
the hundreds of smaller carriers that compete with AT&T in the market
for long distance communications. The list of beneficiaries extends, of
course, to the scores of firms, large and small, that compete with AT&T
in the market for communications equipment. There were also benefits
to those businesses that buy long-distance service or communications
equipment, which is virtually every business in America, from Mom and
Pop stores to the Fortune 500.
In addition to lower prices, the intense rivalry made possible by the
break-up of AT&T caused innovation in long-distance and communica-
tions equipment to rush forward literally at the speed of light. The phrase
"at the speed of light" is appropriate because increased competition in
long-distance communication hastened the deployment of multiple fiber
optic networks throughout the nation. It was only after the MFJ that




8. Edmund L. Andrews, No-Holds-Barred Battle for Long-Distance Calls, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 1995, at 1.
9. Robert E. Hall, Long Distance: Public Benefits from Increased Competition (Ap-
plied Economics Partners), Oct. 1993, at i.
10. See ROBERT W. CRANDALL, AFTER THE BREAKUP: U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS
IN A MORE COMPETITIVE EA. 44 (1991) (average annual increase of 12.1% in real output
of interstate switched message telephone service between 1983 and 1988).
11. Hall, supra note 9, at 18.
12. Andrews, supra note 8, at 1.
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fiber optics really took off. In part, this was because AT&T, Coming, and
others working on fiber optic technology brought down its costs.
The breakup itself accelerated things. New entrants into the long-dis-
tance telephone business, like Sprint, MCI, and smaller firms, turned to
Coming to provide fiber optics. Eventually, AT&T was forced to install
fiber optic cable itself in order to match the quality and cost of its com-
petitors. As a Corning executive recently told Congress, "[h]ad the MFJ
not been entered, optical fiber may still be in the lab.' 13
The widespread deployment of fiber optic cable will have ramifications
for the lives of all Americans-indeed, people across the globe-that are
beyond prediction. No predictions will be ventured. This draws to mind
the story of the sage who, shortly after the invention of the telephone,
boldly predicted that it would revolutionize communication: "Eventu-
ally," he said, "every single town in America would have a telephone to
keep in touch with the outside world."
The benefits of antitrust policy are not unique to the Bell System case
or the telecommunications industry. Last year, the Division brought and
settled a case against Pilkington, the British glass manufacturer that has
long had a monopoly over float glass production technology. 14 Float
glass is used for windows and architectural panels by the construction
industry and for windshields and windows by the automobile industry; in
short, it is a huge, international market worth some $15 billion a year.15
The Division concluded after an extensive investigation that Pilkington
was foreclosing American glass manufacturers from competing in foreign
markets. The Division's complaint alleged that in the early 1960s, Pilk-
ington entered into unreasonably restrictive licensing arrangements with
its most likely competitors, then for three decades used these arrange-
ments and threats of litigation to prevent American businesses from com-
peting to design, build, and operate float glass plants in other countries.
By the time of the suit against Pilkington in May 1994, its patents had
long since expired and its technology for the most part had entered the
public domain. 16
The consent decree accepted by Pilkington to settle the case bars it
from restraining American (and foreign) firms which desire to sell tech-
nology outside the United States.17 As a result, American businesses will
be able to compete for the fifty new glass plants expected to be built
13. Justice Department and Telecommunications Policy: Hearings Before the House
Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (testimony of Timothy J. Regan, Division
Vice President and Director of Public Policy, Coming, Inc.), available at 1995 WL 269771
at *15 (May 9, 1995).
14. United States v. Pilkington plc, 1994-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,842 (D. Ariz. June
14, 1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 30,604 (1994).
15. Complaint of Petitioner at 5-6, United States v. Pilkington plc, 1994-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 70,842 (D. Ariz. June 14, 1994) (No. 94-345) (on file with the SMU Law Review).
16. Id.
17. See supra note 14, at 73,669.
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around the world over the next six years.18 This competition-on a play-
ing field made level by vigorous, intelligent antitrust enforcement-could
increase U.S. export revenues by as much as $1.25 billion during that
period. 19
The bottom line is that rivalry-the opportunity to compete and suc-
ceed-serves our economy best. Professors Mike Scherer of Harvard
and William Comanor of the University of California at Santa Barbara
recently assessed the long-term effects of antitrust enforcement by com-
paring developments over the last eighty years in the American oil and
steel industries.20 The government's section 2 case against Standard Oil
culminated in 1911 with the dismantling of that company's monopoly of
the oil industry.21 By contrast, a similar attempt failed with regard to the
steel industry,22 leaving that industry dominated by United States Steel
(U.S. Steel), a combination of some 170 previously independent
entities.23
Over the following years, the Standard Oil successors-such as Exxon,
Mobil, ARCO, Conoco, Amoco, and Chevron (as they are now
known)-confronted the challenges of a relatively competitive domestic
market. Today, they are among the leaders of the international petro-
leum industry. On the other hand, U.S. Steel faced no serious domestic
competition and, as Professors Scherer and Comanor explain, "slowly but
surely lost its lead of an industry that felt impelled to seek government
protection from foreign competition. '24 U.S. Steel's role in technological
innovation within the steel industry steadily dropped through the middle
of the century. This is in stark contrast to the contributions of American-
based oil companies, whose share of innovations during the same period
exceeded their share of refining capacity. 25
In the last decade, the American steel industry has renewed itself and
has greatly increased its ability to succeed in a global market. But it has
done so by doing what American businesses do as well as or better than
any in the world-responding to competition and innovating new and
better ways of doing business.
Professors Comanor and Scherer sought through quantitative analysis
to determine what role the antitrust enforcement of the early twentieth
century had in the relative fortunes of the oil and steel industries. They
concluded that competition brought about by antitrust enforcement in
18. See supra note 15, at 6. See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
FILES FIRST ANTITRUST SUIT AGAINST FOREIGN COMPANY SINCE 1992 POLICY CHANGE 3
(1994) (on file with the SMU Law Review).
19. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 3.
20. William S. Comanor & F.M. Scherer, Rewriting History: The Early Sherman Act
Monopolization Cases (Nov. 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the SMU Law
Review).
21. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
22. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
23. Comanor & Scherer, supra note 20, at 18.
24. ld at 4.
25. Id. at 11-12, 28.
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the oil industry had positive consequences for the industry's subsequent
development, and hence for the American economy.26 They also sug-
gested that successful enforcement against U.S. Steel would have in-
creased competition in the steel industry between the two world wars and
averted what they term "the tragic failures that occurred more
recently. 27
Based on their detailed analysis of the oil and steel industries and gen-
eral observations of other industries that were the subject of early Sher-
man Act cases, Professors Comanor and Scherer confirmed what
advocates of intelligent antitrust policy have long believed: "[D]ynamic
efficiency and the ability to compete internationally come ... from the
disciplining force of vigorous domestic competition. Competition among
numerous enterprises on a level playing field, rather than the consolida-
tion of assets in a few hands, appears to be a more powerful engine for
economic progress."'28
This connection between competition and economic dynamism accords
with the findings of Professor Michael Porter's landmark study of interna-
tional competitiveness, The Competitive Advantage of Nations.29 He con-
cluded flatly that "[f]irms that do not have to compete at home rarely
succeed abroad."' 30 The reason? Domestic rivalry spurs innovation,
which is an essential element of international economic success. Thus,
antitrust policy that promotes competitive markets contributes directly to
America's economic health and vitality.
The choice that faces policy makers on the threshold of the twenty-first
century is whether the American economy's performance over the com-
ing years should more closely resemble the vitality and international lead-
ership of the American oil industry in the twentieth century, or the
decline and stagnation of the American steel industry during that period.
To state the alternatives is to answer the question: America must opt for
an environment of vigorous competition and economic opportunity.
America's prosperity depends on it. And to achieve such an environment
requires alert, intelligent antitrust enforcement.
III. ANTITRUST IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
There are those who suggest that antitrust enforcement is obsolete-of
no more relevance to the twenty-first century economy than the rotary
phone. Others go even further and suggest that antitrust enforcement
will disadvantage American companies and will harm America's eco-
nomic well-being. These suggestions are fundamentally wrong. As the
role of innovation in the economy and the importance of international
competitiveness grow, so does the necessity for intelligent antitrust en-
26. Id. at 42-43.
27. Id. at 43.
28. Comanor & Scherer, supra note 20, at 43-44.
29. MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS (1990).
30. Id. at 662.
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forcement. Such enforcement promotes an environment in which com-
petitors spur each other to faster innovation. As Professor Porter has
explained, "[a]ll we have learned about the innovation process suggests
that a number of entities pursuing different avenues, watching each other
to try to learn from the other's approach, is often the best structure. Di-
versity and multiple paths of innovation yield the most rapid progress. '31
Intelligent antitrust enforcement in the twenty-first century will protect
and promote competitive diversity.
IV. CONCLUSION
To be sure, the dynamic economy implied by increasing globalization
and accelerating technological change challenges antitrust enforcers to
appreciate changing conditions in the marketplace. We must always be
alert, for example, that we do not confuse protecting the competitive pro-
cess with protecting a particular competitor. It is the nature of the com-
petitive process that some competitors will fail; we cannot and should not
try to prevent that outcome. What we must do-what is critical to the
nation's economic health-is ensure that firms with market power do not
distort the competitive process by imposing artificial restraints. What we
strive for, in short, is open competition on the merits-a system that his-
torically has benefitted consumers by prodding competing firms to de-
velop and deliver goods and services of the highest quality, at the lowest
cost and has benefitted American companies by preparing them to com-
pete and succeed abroad.
31. Innovation, Rivalry, and Competitive Advantage: Interview with Professor Michael
E. Porter, 6 ANTITRusT 5, 7 (1991).
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